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SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE HISTORY SERIES 
 
Identifying Communists: Continuity in Political Policing, 1931-1951 
 
On 14 April 1931, Constable E.R. Trask wrote a report which began: ‘I respectfully report 
that acting on instructions received, I attended a Communist Meeting, which was held in the 
Communist hall.’1  He carefully noted the names of all those who attended whom he believed 
to be Communists.  This typified police practice at that time.  In other words, identification 
and surveillance of suspected or known Communists in meetings, on demonstrations and in 
other settings, dominated political policing long before the Cold War.  For the New Zealand 
Police Force, anti-communism was an organising world-view, with Communist influence 
their general explanation for any radical activity.   
 
This article examines how New Zealand Police officers understood dissent among 
unemployed workers in the 1930s and during the 1951 waterfront dispute, and concludes that 
continuity in political policing prevailed, despite the momentous events of World War Two 
and the early Cold War years which intervened.  It argues that policing methodology is a 
form of social knowledge, so that the words in the written police archives need to be seen in 
the broader perspective of surveillance as a knowledge system into which new constables 
were socialised.  For example, each year detectives from other centres were sent to 
Christchurch during its Show Week in November to keep their ‘own city criminals under 
observation and to point them out’ to local police.2  This model of policing was already dated 
by the 1930s, even more so by the 1950s, but it continued to inform and structure political 
policing.   
 
The unemployed workers’ campaigns of the early 1930s, and the 1951 waterfront dispute, 
were two high-points of dissent that caused great anxiety to the state.  From the police 
perspective they were similar threats, making comparison between the two productive.  
Communists were involved in both sets of events, but the majority of people who took action 
that the state found especially threatening – rioting in the 1930s and refusing to work or 
supporting the watersiders in 1951 – were not Communists, at least in the sense of being 
members of the Communist Party.  Thus the police model, identifying and surveilling 
Communists presumed to be behind the disturbances, was inadequate for explaining the cause 
and extent of dissent.   
 
Studying police political surveillance during these two periods of rebellion against the 
established political economy reveals both normal practice and its weaknesses.  There is a 
practical reason for selecting the Unemployed Workers’ Movement (UWM) and waterfront 
dispute files to examine such issues: both have extensive police files that have been released 
to Archives New Zealand.  In 1956, the newly established New Zealand Security Service, 
later renamed the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), took control of police 
political surveillance files.  In recent years the NZSIS has begun transferring declassified files 
to Archives New Zealand.  While only 104  files on historical subjects have currently been 
released, 13 of these cover the UWM and 18 cover the 1951 waterfront dispute.  Taken 
together these two sets of events cover a substantial portion of the New Zealand political 
surveillance material that has been made accessible.  
 
There is much scope for academic work on political policing in New Zealand history.  
Analyses of the reasons behind the transfer of political surveillance from the Police Force to 
the NZSIS have inevitably focused on the inadequacies of political policing.
3
  Their work 
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reinforces a traditional Cold War narrative that sees Communists as a new and different threat 
after the end of World War Two.  More useful for this article’s focus on continuity is Graeme 
Dunstall’s excellent official history of the police from 1918-1945.  Dunstall dedicated a 
chapter to political policing and provided evidence of a long history of policing 
Communists.
4
  Redmer Yska’s article about police surveillance of a Wellington social 
grouping in the 1950s (the ‘Vegetable Club’), whose attendees included some Communists, 
demonstrates the effort police expended on labelling Communists and the seriousness which 
undercover police gave to even trivial remarks on social occasions.
5
  This article builds on 
these two works by concentrating on case studies where the subjects of surveillance were 
involved in sustained rebellion, and asks what these case studies can tell us about police 
analysis and worldview.   
 
The police model: monitoring and identifying communists as troublemakers  
 
In early April 1931, unemployed workers marched through the streets of Wellington, with 
many police officers in attendance.  Each policeman present wrote a report carefully noting 
the names of those they had seen at the demonstration who they believed to be Communists.  
Constable J.M. Bourke stated: ‘The only communists that I know by name who were in the 
parade were Brazier and Myrtle Jones.’6  Three other constables mentioned these in their 
reports.
7
  Constable H.R. Rush identified Jones and another local Communist called John 
Sandford; Constable L.W. O’Sullivan recognised Brazier and another he named as Riley; and 
Constable G. Tomlinson just recognised Brazier.
8
  Acting Detective R.H. Waterson, who 
spent a lot of time on political policing, gave the first and last names of the men he saw: John 
Sandford, Bernard Boston and Philip Gordon Brazier.
9
  While the ability and confidence of 
policemen to identify the Communists varied, their emphasis on the need to name those on 
the march was consistent. 
 
In their elaborations on the individuals who were named, police reports arising from the 
march in April 1931 were typical of political-policing practice in that period.  Detective N.W. 
Laugeson discussed five such men in terms of their employment, all in the same format: 
‘COMMUNIST YOUNG This Communist is at present employed at the Belfast Freezing 
Works.’10  A police evaluation of George Budd, in preparation for his trial arising from the 
demonstration, stated: ‘He is a man of bad character and nothing can be said in his favour.’11  
Most of the evidence to support this analysis related to his involvement in the Communist 
Party rather than to any illegal actions.  As well as identifying suspected Communists, police 
also paid attention to both the flying and the singing of The Red Flag as signifiers of 
communism.
12
  Detective P.J. Nalder, reporting on a July 1930, noted not only the singing of 
The Red Flag at the end of the meeting but also that the accompanying violinist was a 
Communist.
13
  In one report the singing of The Red Flag was marked in blue pencil, a 
marking that was reserved for events that required further police action.
14
  
 
All ranks of the police emphasised the identification of individual Communists.  Senior 
Sergeant Butler identified and named three Communists out of a group of less than a dozen 
men protesting in December 1930.
15
  In each main centre one detective was assigned to the 
work of political surveillance.
16
  While their reports were more detailed and knowledgeable 
than those produced by constables, they too focused on identifying Communists and their 
activities.  Reports moved up the police hierarchy. When the Commissioner reported to the 
Minister of Justice about members of a deputation to Parliament, he used the language of 
those who made the initial identifications, giving reasonably full descriptions of four of the 
attendees and their history.
17
  Police also wrote extensive reports about identified 
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Communists when they travelled to New Zealand from elsewhere.
18
  From constables to 
Commissioner, then, the Police Force had a consistent model of understanding what lay 
behind dissident political activity. 
 
 
One of the advantages of a labelling system of political analysis was that it was easy for 
police officers, without much education or political background, to understand.  Dunstall 
described a new Dunedin detective who ‘made his first acquaintance with “Carl Marks” when 
a Communist from Wellington spoke on “Communism and Industrialism” in June 1921.’19  
Among other routes, constables learned about individual Communists from senior colleagues, 
just as they learned about known criminals.  In 1932 Constable Norris noted of a meeting that 
the ‘chairman was a man who Detective Laugeson informed me was Reginald Reedy’, the 
detective being in charge of monitoring Communists in Christchurch.
20
  In April 1931, 
Constable E.R. Trask attended an UWM meeting in Wellington with Detective N.W. Baylis, 
who was responsible for the surveillance of suspected subversives in that city.  Trask did not 
know a prominent person present, describing him as ‘a man named Sim’,21 while Baylis 
noted that ‘we were met by Communist Leo Sim.’22  In his next report, Trask wrote 
extensively about Sim with a confidence missing from his earlier report, indicating the 
probability of a briefing in the meantime.
23
   
 
Police also used the Police Gazette, which included photographs of individuals in custody or 
released from gaol, to monitor Communists.  For example, in Detective O.S. Power’s report 
from April 1932 on ‘Communist Activities in New Zealand’, he referred to two individuals’ 
previous appearances in the Police Gazette, emphasising their Communist affiliation.  One of 
the entries reads: ‘KENNETH BAXTER who was to assist Blance in laying the foundation of 
a branch of the Communist Party here is referred to in Police Gazette 1926, page 110.’24   
 
 
As well as identifying individual members of the Communist Party, where they used a tight 
definition of the word Communist, the police also used it as a loose term to refer to anyone 
who questioned or rebelled against authority, including members of the Communist Party.  
Despite only being able to name two Communists at the April 1931 demonstration mentioned 
above, Constable Bourke described it as follows: ‘There were about 200 unemployed and 
communists and also 3 women.’25  In July 1930 Detective Nalder attended a meeting of a 
hundred people where The Red Flag was sung and reported that ‘[t]he only persons that 
joined in the singing were members of the Communist Party.’26  Singing The Red Flag, for 
him, signified that the singer was a Communist.   
 
In another demonstration in April 1931, police officers used both tight and loose definitions 
of Communists.  After unemployed workers processioned to Parliament; they were refused 
entry and there was conflict with the police.  Constable Fell, who arrested Roy Goode, stated: 
‘Goode was in company with a number of Communists who were trying to force their way 
past the Police into the grounds.’27  However, Detective Laugesen, the Wellington officer 
responsible for political surveillance, stated that J.J. Robinson was the only Communist who 
took part in the disturbance, explicitly naming other Communists who had nothing to do with 
it.
28
  The term Communist, then, functioned differently in the two reports.  Laugesen was 
talking specifically about members of the Communist Party, while Fell’s statement made 
sense according to the police worldview: trouble was the result of Communist activity, and 
therefore troublemakers were Communists. 
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Using the looser definition people of Communist in which anyone who dissented was deemed 
a Communist, enabled policemen to explain dissent as inspired by the Communist Party.  
When miners in Huntly began to organise, the local police officer blamed Communism: ‘The 
majority of the men here are a very quiet peaceable crowd, but now the Communist Party (of 
whom there are about a dozen) have got hold of the control of the Unemployed Union, there 
is only one result to be anticipated.’29  The Commissioner of Police described members of an 
unemployed deputation that had come from outside of Wellington as ‘merely tools in the 
hands of the Communists.’30  When relief workers went on strike in Wellington in 1931, 
Detective N.W. Baylis stated that the majority of them were deceived by Communists into 
thinking the Labour Party supported their actions.
31
  Police reported frequently on the actions 
of those they saw as Communists, tightly or loosely defined, because their model of the world 
put Communists at the centre of their understanding of social discontent and political 
rebellion. 
 
Flaws within the police model  
 
As the effects of the Depression came to be felt more strongly, unemployed workers became 
much more organised, especially after the formation of the National Unemployed Workers’ 
Movement in 1931.  Demonstrations by the unemployed increased and saw major riots in 
Auckland, Wellington and Dunedin.
32
  While Communist Party members took part in such 
actions, they formed only a small part of the movement, and policemen struggled to fit this 
into their worldview.  When there was any suggestion that unemployed workers might take 
action, for example, the police response was to pay even more attention to identifying and 
surveilling Communists.  When in March 1931 the rates of relief were reduced, the Auckland 
detective in charge of political policing, P.J. Nalder, reported that Communists were 
advocating strike action among the relief workers, although he did not know if they would do 
so.  There are two further notes on the report from other police officers, one indicating that a 
strike did take place.  The other from Auckland’s Superintendent S. Till, addressed to the 
Commissioner, stating that a ‘close watch is being kept on the communist leaders here.’33  It 
seems that the only way even senior policemen could imagine that relief workers might go on 
strike is if they were influenced to so by Communists, who were thereby even more tightly 
monitored than previously.  
 
Yet while the police emphasised Communist influences they also downplayed their appeal to 
workers and the unemployed.  This occurred in two ways.  Firstly, policemen were inclined 
to believe that large protest gatherings of the unemployed or others were being stacked by 
Communists.  Thus a detective reported that Communists were trying to dominate 
unemployed meetings, ‘and no doubt they are sometimes successful as they pack the 
meetings with seafaring men who are in sympathy with their cause.’34  Secondly, policemen 
assumed that because they saw Communist ideas as beyond the pale they assumed that these 
could not have any effect on public audiences who were not Communists.  When large 
numbers of people attended a meeting in Wellington in 1932, police reports thus downplayed 
the interest of those present: ‘These speakers were listened to by a crowd of some six or 
seven hundred but those interested would not be more than a hundred.  When cheers were 
called for at the finish it was very noticeable that only a few answered.’35  Another report of 
the same event suggested that those attending were ‘disinterested’.36   
 
Not only did police political analysis leave very little space for understanding why 
Communist ideas might resonate with some members of the public, they also treated 
‘Communist’ as a stable category.  Yet in the early 1930s, as Kerry Taylor has demonstrated, 
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there was huge turn-over in Communist Party membership which was related to internal 
disputation.  During 1931 the Wellington membership peaked in May at a high of 80 but, by 
January 1932, this had fallen to 25.
37
  That year, indeed, the Party’s control commission 
expelled 21 members, a quarter of the Party’s membership.38  There was plenty of evidence 
before the police that ‘communist’ was an instable label.  For example, after they had left the 
Communist Party, Petone’s Frederick Perrin and Joseph Turner were prosecuted for speaking 
without a permit because the Communist Party held the authorisation to speak.
39
  When John 
Sandford travelled the country in 1932, the Commissioner of Police described him as ‘a fairly 
good speaker, and [with] a good deal of ability as an organiser’, but noted that he was ‘an ex-
member of the Communist Party’,40  something remarked upon the previous year in a 
pencilled note (‘expelled’) on Detective F.N. Robinson’s report describing Sandford as a 
Communist.
41
  In Christchurch, where there was conflict and turnover within the UWM 
committee, the police kept careful track of this, annotating the names of each new set of 
members with comments such as ‘Communist’, ‘Expelled Communist’ or ‘Unemployed’.42  
While this article does not cover informants within the UWM (or the dissenting workers in 
1951), the uniformed and plain-clothed policemen’s analyses were assisted by supplementary 
information by paid and unpaid informants and infiltrators within the ranks of the targeted 
movements.  Such ‘insiders’ often gave full reports of the reasons for individuals being 
expelled from the party.
43
  Despite a great deal of information before them, however, the 
police continued to categorise Communists as a unified category whose identification and 
monitoring would be the key to understanding and controlling dissent.  
 
Yet they also knew that many radical actions were not inspired by Communists in either the 
tight or loose definition of the word.  Indeed, they were well aware that the Communist Party 
actively opposed some of the radical political action that took place in the 1930s – as with the 
Wellington relief workers’ strike in 1932: ‘Griffin, Galbraith and Robinson – leaders of the 
Communist Party – have expressed themselves as being opposed to a strike just now as the 
organisation is insufficient and it would probably fizzle out in a few days.’44  An informant 
added evidence that the Communist Party was not involved in the ensuing strike, and gave 
information about some of those who had agitated for it: ‘Today F. Perrin went to Petone and 
J. Turner to Lower Hutt to endeavour to influence the Relief Workers in favour of a strike.  
These two men are leaders in the Unemployed Workers’ Movement, but not now connected 
with the Communist Party as members.’45  Yet police analyses continued to see dissident 
activity as Communist-inspired.  
 
The 1951 Dispute 
 
The 1951 waterfront dispute saw 16,000 workers either locked out or on strike in mining, 
waterfront, freezing works and other workplaces.  Cabinet took control of the dispute early 
on, and declared emergency regulations that de-registered the watersiders’ union, directed 
armed services to work on the wharves and criminalised many activities involved in the 
strike.  Prime Minister Sidney Holland and the popular press used Cold War rhetoric against 
the workers involved in the lockout and strikes.
46
  While a number of people prominently 
involved in the events of 1951 were members of the Communist Party, however, the leaders 
of the New Zealand Union Waterfront Workers’ Union (NZWWU) were not – and neither 
were the vast majority of those who were locked out or went on strike.  
 
Yet police reports about the waterside dispute focused on Communists.  When a group of 
Auckland trade unionists visited Wellington, Detective Sergeant Dave Paterson compiled 
extensive histories of all of them, including whether a subversive history sheet had been 
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created for them and especially if they had been active in the Communist Party.
47
  When 
discussing the decision of the Seamen’s Union to go on strike, Paterson stated that the ‘action 
suggested is typical of that which would be taken at this time by militant trade unionists and 
Communists’, and specifically singled out Tommy Hepinstall, a Communist.48  Senior 
Detective J.J. Halcrow of the Special Branch wrote a Communist Party-centred assessment of 
the executive of the Christchurch branch of the NZWWU even though, according to his 
information, just one member of it was in the Communist Party.  All but that one were 
classified as ‘leftist’, some of these with alleged links to the Communist Party, or were noted 
as having ‘no adverse comment’ attached to them.49  The focus on Communism came from 
the highest political as well as the lowest policing levels.  The Commissioner of Police 
circulated a memorandum in March 1951 noting that ‘I am receiving many reports from the 
Ministers to the effect that meetings are being held and addressed by strike agitators and 
members of the Communist Party.’50   
 
 
The police worldview created the problems in 1951 as it had in the 1930s.  Fundamentally, it 
could not explain why people supported dissent, and in terms of the dispute itself their 
consistent belief was that events were being propelled by a few, mostly Communist agitators.  
This led them to assess that the vast majority of workers did not support the dispute, and 
would be willing to begin work again on the wharf on the Government’s terms if it were not 
for intimidation: ‘these men are frightened to start a new union owing to the remaining 
percentage being leftish in their views.’51   
 
The police worldview, and their focus on surveilling suspected Communist agitators, made it 
difficult for police to understand what was happening; for example they found it hard to 
understand moderate unionists who supported the NZWWU.  In early March, at the 
beginning the waterfront dispute, Inspector Johnston wrote a summary of a meeting in which 
he described the Secretary of the Nelson branch of the NZWWU, Alfred Jones, as follows: 
‘He is held in high esteem by all classes of the community including his employers and is 
generally recognized as a man of good standing possessing most moderate views.’52  He had 
engaged in extended conversation with Jones, who had indicated that he had no problem with 
the employers, and contrasted him with the branch president, Ernest Lock, whom he 
described as the leader of the agitators.  Within the month, however, Johnston’s view had 
changed to fit Jones into the police anti-communist worldview.   
 
While the emergency regulations empowered the police to ban union meetings, the Nelson 
police authorised a watersiders’ meeting, hoping that the workers would decide to go back to 
work.  At the meeting, however, the union rejected the idea en masse and Lock led them out 
of the building.
53
  Jones had chaired the meeting and had supported the refusal to 
recommence work, causing Johnston to reassess his view of him.  But the Inspector still 
believed that the dispute was being prolonged by radical leaders; it was just that he had 
transferred Jones to that category.  He wrote: ‘I feel satisfied that a number of the watersiders 
are willing to work but they are under the influence of Lock and Jones and lack the strength 
and decision to form a new union of their own.’54  The idea that radical individuals with 
ideological motives were behind the dispute made it difficult for the police to understand both 
moderate union leaders and the continued refusal of the bulk of the members to work. 
 
More than any other officer, the Special Branch’s Detective Sergeant Dave Paterson took 
note of evidence that contradicted his worldview.  Detective Sergeant Paterson took a 
prominent role in policing the fallout from the waterfront dispute while remaining a true 
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believer in the Communist menace.  At a seminar to mark the 50th anniversary of the dispute, 
radio producer Jack Perkins mentioned that he had talked to Dave Paterson: ‘he still to this 
day believes that … everything he did was justified in terms of the communist threat.’55  In 
his reports during the dispute he expressed himself in vivid language: ‘The watersiders’ sore 
is still discharging and also the freezing-workers, although the latter has healed in parts and 
the bandages have been removed from the ASRS [Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants].’56   
 
Very early in the 1951 dispute, Paterson reported in March that he had heard from Wellington 
watersiders that the dispute was not led by communists.  He then canvassed political 
positions that he believed showed that the watersiders’ union was following the Communist 
Party line: their statement that armaments for the conflict in Malaya would not be loaded, for 
example, and that they were against the gaoling of American union leader Harry Bridges.
57
  
To Paterson it was incomprehensible that any unionist could take these two positions except 
under the influence of Communists, who he believed had inspired the dispute in the first 
place.  While he knew that only a fraction of the participants in the dispute were Communists, 
he believed that ‘the individual trade unionist is not fully alive to [Communist designs] and 
that he is in many cases a dupe to the communists in the old trade union call of 
“solidarity”.’58  In another report he stated that the ‘manner in which bona fide freezing 
workers have allowed themselves to be led along by the nose was amply illustrated at a mass 
meeting of former members of this union.’  His evidence for this was that the motion to 
continue the strike was put by Albert Birchfield, a Communist who had joined the union just 
before the freezing workers went on strike.
59
  Paterson considered his brief very wide, and his 
reports included advice to the Government on subjects such as the security of the wharves.   
 
Prominent leaders of the Wellington watersiders put some effort into trying to persuade 
Paterson that his understanding of the dispute was wrong, but this had little effect.  Toby Hill, 
the Secretary of the NZWWU, had a long conversation to try and convince him that he was 
not a Communist, and that his union did not follow the Communist Party line.  Hill explained 
that he was Catholic, and had been at times criticised in the union movement for his religious 
beliefs.  On the issue of the NZWWU’s affiliation with the Soviet-orientated World 
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which had been used by many public figure (including 
the cartoonist Gordon Minhinnick) to convince people that the watersiders were Communist-
influenced,
60
 Hill explained that this membership was a practical one – and indeed that the 
NZWWU had never paid its affiliation fees.
61
  He did acknowledge that there were individual 
Communists involved in the union, but put considerable effort into trying to persuade 
Paterson the union as a whole was not a Communist front union.  While Paterson wrote down 
Hill’s views, they do not seem to have changed his analysis, and nor did the views of another, 
unnamed watersider he spoke to who declared that Communists had negligible influence 
within his union (and, again, that affiliation fees to the WFTU had not been paid).
62
   
 
Nor was Paterson moved by a conversation with Eddie Napier, a leader of the Wellington 
watersiders, who also rejected the idea that either he or his union were Communist, and 
further argued that Communists were not a significant force in the union.  Peterson dismissed 
this position by noting that the secretary of the Hutt Valley Branch of the Communist Party 
had visited Napier at home and talked to him for half an hour in March, and by ending the 
report by claiming that ‘there is no gainsaying that watersiders in Wellington are receiving 
moral and financial support from the Communist Party here.’63  
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But the effect of Paterson’s inability to understand the origins and meaning of the events he 
was monitoring was that he consistently failed to predict what would happen next.  When 
initially analysing the likely actions the Wellington drivers’ union would take during the 
dispute, he had focused on the politics of its leaders, emphasising that they had no known 
contact with the Communist Party and therefore predicting that they would not strike.
64
  
However, the union did end up participating in the dispute, and being deregistered 
accordingly.   
 
Moreover, in mid-May 1951, Paterson asserted that the tide was turning inside the 
Wellington watersiders’ union, and that a large number of its members were going to return 
to work soon,
65
  an assessment he repeated in early June.
66
  In the event, only 83 out of more 
than 2,000 members of the union returned to work on the Wellington waterfront before the 
lockout was over.
67
  That month he also reported that the ‘suggestion has been made that only 
the most militant section of the strikers here, possibly only the communist group, are likely to 
give Barnes  [Jock Barnes, the President of the NZWWU] support in public demonstrations 
or acts of violence.’68  But as it turned out, there were several large public demonstrations in 
Wellington between late May and the end of the dispute.  Paterson, like other political 
policeman, had continued throughout the dispute to see radical action within the union 
movement only in terms of Communists and their dupes, and they were surprised when large 
numbers of unionists engaged in such actions.  Identifying Communists, and using their 
influence as an explanation for any kind of rebellion against authority, was so central to the 
police worldview that even when the facts showed otherwise there was no fundamental re-
evaluation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Between the 1931 and 1951, despite momentous world events and ongoing political 
surveillance, there was very little change in the way police analysed dissent, and thus the 
limitations of an approach based on identifying Communists remained in place.  Political 
surveillance in New Zealand, then, remained shaped not by the conditions immediately after 
the First World War, when the police adapted their existing worldview and practices around 
crime to political surveillance – one that divided the world up into good citizens and a small 
number of individual criminals.  This binary labelling, and the practices that went with it, was 
easily carried over to political policing, with the Communists substituting for the criminals.  
Such practices described did not end when police lost primary responsibility to the New 
Zealand Security Service in 1956.Miriam Wharton has argued that identifying subversive 
people and organisations dominated the work of the early years of the NZSIS, at least partly 
because it was much easier than other forms of security and intelligence work.
69
  In the 
decades that followed, the NZSIS would face ever greater challenges in understanding dissent 
against authority.  When the New Zealand Communist Party was the only one in the world to 
follow China during the Sino-Soviet split, labelling and monitoring Communists became an 
even more complex task.  This was quickly followed by the social and political unrest of the 
later 1960s onwards, which could not be categorised in terms of Communist influence – 
however much the political police might try.  
 
From the 1920s until the 1950s, and beyond, the police had a shared worldview when it came 
to political policing, from the Commissioner down to constables: identifying Communists 
was their key way of understanding the messy world of social and political protest and 
proactivity, something in which a constable (with his limited education) could be trained 
reasonably quickly.  With the flawed knowledge of both dissent and Communism which it 
9 
Security and Surveillance History Series, 2017/x 
provided, in some ways the labelling system failed them, limiting their ability to predict what 
might happen.  But more broadly, the police and the Government did generally maintain the 
type of order and control that they wanted, and so labelling Communists contributed to 
controlling dissent even if the system was not an appropriate model for understanding social 
and political unrest and dissent. 
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